BRR’s 50 State Noncompete Chart Updated – South Carolina

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The BRR 50 State Noncompete Chart has been updated today (April 12, 2011) to reflect an update to South Carolina’s handling of overly broad restrictions. Specifically, the South Carolina Supreme Court has expressly rejected “rewriting or ‘blue-penciling’ . . . territorial restriction[s].” Poynter Inves., Inc. v. Century Builders of Piedmont, Inc., 387 S.C. 583, 587 (2010).

The case involved a lower court that had rewritten language in the parties’ agreement. Specifically, the lower court had removed language in the agreement that it deemed to be too broad, and then inserted its own language for that of the parties. Such judicial rewriting of a restrictive covenant is called “reformation” (or “modification”) – not “blue penciling.” (Blue penciling is where a court simply strikes the offending language and then reads the contract with such omitted; nothing else in the contract changes.) The SC Supreme Court, however, erroneously referred to the lower court’s modification as “blue penciling.”

Appellation aside, the the SC Supreme Court’s decision provided as follows: “[I]n South Carolina, the restrictions in a non-compete clause cannot be rewritten by a court or limited by the parties’ [subsequent] agreement, but must stand or fall on their own terms. We hold, therefore, that the trial judge erred in rewriting the territorial restriction in the parties’ contract.” Poynter Inves., 387 S.C. at 588. Under the circumstances of the case, this holding indicates that South Carolina rejected reformation. It does not speak to blue penciling.

Nevertheless, I am informed by Josh Smith of Roe Cassidy Coates & Price – who, with Randy Moody, successfully represented the appellant in the case – that South Carolina practitioners interpret the court’s decision as rejecting both reformation and blue penciling. Instructively, in this regard, Josh Smith also informed me that the appellee did not argue the distinction between blue penciling and reformation – and did not argue that the court could apply the contractual “step down” provisions. (The step down provisions would have allowed the court to blue pencil the contract and then enforce it based on the more narrow portion of the agreement.)

Accordingly, I have updated the chart to reflect the apparently prevailing view of a more expansive reading of the holding (i.e., applying the “red pencil” or “all or nothing” approach) – though I believe that such an interpretation is still up for debate.

The chart is available for download here.

Economic Espionage Act Update

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Recognizing the need to crack down on misappropriation of trade secrets, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has stepped up its enforcement of the Economic Espionage Act, among other statutes. See the DOJ’s IP Task Force announcement and a post at my prior law firm’s Trade Secret / Noncompete Blog.

Presumably motivated by the same concerns, several US Senators are now seeking to increase the penalties for violations of the Economic Espionage Act. A nice summary by a law student at American University, Washington College of Law appears here.

The text of the bill is as follows:

A BILL

To increase the penalties for economic espionage.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the `Economic Espionage Penalty Enhancement Act’.

SEC. 2. AMENDMENT TO TITLE 18.

    Section 1831(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking `15 years’ and inserting `20 years’.

SEC. 3. DIRECTIVE TO SENTENCING COMMISSION.

    Pursuant to its authority under section 994(p) of title 28, United States Code, the United States Sentencing Commission shall–
    (1) review its guidelines and policy relating to a two-level enhancement for economic espionage; and
    (2) as a part of such review consider amending such guidelines to–

(A) apply the two-level enhancement to the simple misappropriation of a trade secret;

(B) apply an additional two-level enhancement if the defendant transmits or attempts to transmit the stolen trade secret outside of the United States and an additional three-level enhancement if the defendant instead commits economic espionage (i.e., he/she knew or intended that the offense would benefit a foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent); and

(C) provide when a defendant transmits trade secrets outside of the United States or commits economic espionage, that the defendant should face a minimum offense level.

 

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